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Abstract
SoftECC is software memory integrity checking agent. SoftECC repeatedly com-
putes page-level checksums as an efficient means to verify that a page's contents have
not changed. Memory errors that occur between two checksum computations will
cause the two checksum values to disagree. Legitimate memory writes also cause a
change in checksum value, so a page can only be protected during periods of time
when it is not being written to. Preliminary measurements with an implementation of
SoftECC in the JOS kernel on the x86 architecture show that SoftECC can halve
the number of undetectable soft errors using minimal compute time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Failing, damaged, or improperly clocked memory can introduce bit errors leading to
crashes, freeze-ups, or even data corruption. Even correctly functioning DRAM cells
are subject to cosmic rays that can induce transient, or soft errors. Because there are
many possible causes of system instability, these problems are notoriously hard to di-
agnose. This thesis describes SoftECC, a software memory testing solution designed
to detect and diagnose memory induced stability problems quickly and automatically.
SoftECC's goal is to protect against soft errors in memory without modifying
existing applications. As a kernel-level extension to the virtual memory system,
SoftECC uses the CPU's page-level access permissions to intercept reads and writes
before they occur and repeatedly compute page-level checksums. Using the check-
sums, SoftECC verifies that a page's contents are the same at two different points in
time. A memory error that happens between two checksum computations will cause
the two checksum values to disagree. Legitimate memory writes will also cause a
change in checksum value, so a page can only be protected during periods of time
when it is not being written to.
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1.1 Approach
Every pair of consecutive checksums creates an interval of time. At the end of each
inter-checksum interval, SoftECC can tell three things: if a read has happened, if
the page's contents changed, and if there was a legitimate write. SoftECC cannot
directly detect errors; however, a page change without a legitimate write implies that
an error has occurred. Since writes also imply changes to the page contents, errors
are not detectable during inter-checksum intervals containing a legitimate write.
Consider a single page, P. There are four events of interest that can happen to
P: reads (R), writes (W), checksums (C), and errors (E). The order in which the
occur will determine what assurances SoftECC can provide about memory integrity.
Consider the following possibilities:
Vulnerable Interval: C... W... R... W... R...C
Detection Interval: C... R...R ... R... R...C
Protection Interval: C...................C
An inter-checksum interval with a legitimate write is a "vulnerable interval," as
any errors that occur will go undetected. Two checksum events surrounding a period
of time deviod of writes create a "detection interval," a period of time during
which any memory errors that occur will be detected. Any inter-checksum interval
with neither reads nor writes is called a "protection interval," because SoftECC
guarantees that any errors that occur on page P during this time will be detected
before the user application has a chance to access invalid data. Furthermore, if
SoftECC has stored redundancy information for page P, the error is can be corrected,
allowing the user application to continue running.
SoftECC creates detection intervals inside larger inter-write intervals. To
detect errors during an inter-write interval, SoftECC must calculate a first checksum
at the beginning of the interval, and a second checksum before the end of the inter-
val. Because of the cost of these checksums, not all inter-write intervals are worth
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protecting. SoftECC tries to use checksums to create detection intervals inside the
largest inter-write intervals.
Similarly, because SoftECC cannot verify the integrity of reads that occur during
the same inter-checksum interval as an error, protection intervals can only be
created inside larger inter-read intervals. To reduce an application's vulnerability
to uncorrectable soft errors, SoftECC tries to use checksums to create protection
intervals inside the largest inter-read intervals.
1.2 Vulnerability
A page is vulnerable to undetected soft errors during any vulnerable interval (any
inter-checksum interval containing a write).
For an application, "vulnerability" is defined to be the average number of vul-
nerable pages (its "exposure size") multiplied by the length of real world time that
the computation is running (the "exposure time"). The units of vulnerability are
page-seconds. Vulnerability multiplied by the error density (errors / page / second)
yields the expected number of errors that will occur during a computation (which,
given that it is a very small number, should be very close to the probability of any
errors occurring).
During idle-CPU time, SoftECC lowers an application's vulnerability by check-
summing pages to reduce the application's exposure size. When the CPU is not idle,
SoftECC can lower soft error vulnerability by reducing an application's exposure
size at the cost of increasing the exposure time.
Creating a detection interval of length tdet reduces a computation's exposure
size by one page during that interval, decreasing vulnerability by tdet *1 page-seconds.
However, any time a page checksum is computed, the user application's execution is
put on hold, increasing the application's exposure time by one "checksum time
unit" (tchk ). Thus, the two checksum operations needed to create a detection
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interval increase vulnerability by tchk * nvuin (t 1 ) + tchk * nvrnn (t 2 ) page-seconds, where
nvuin(t) is the number of vulnerable pages at time t. Note that a decision to checksum
a particular interval decreases nvuin by 1 for all checksums during that interval, and
lengthens any encompassing intervals by 2 * tchk.
An omniscient checksumming agent would achieve the minimum possible vul-
nerability by checksumming any inter-write interval where the length of the interval
outweighs the cost of the checksum operations ( tdet > tchk * nvuin (ti) + tchk * nvuin (t 2 )).
A realtime checksumming agent, like SoftECC, will perform worse than the omni-
scient case because SoftECC cannot accurately predict how long until a page will
next be written (tnext ).
At any point in time SoftECC can spend one checksum to speculatively begin a
detection interval worth tnext *1. However, if SoftECC is unlucky and checksums a
page shortly preceding an impending write, then the cost of the checksum operations
will exceed the value of the detection interval for a net increase in vulnerability. If
SoftECC is particularly unlucky, the cost of the second checksum alone will exceed
the value of the detection interval. In this case, SoftECC should allow the write
to proceed without checking, giving up the first checksum operation as a sunk cost.
In order to avoid checksumming a page that will soon be written to, SoftECC
waits to calculate the first checksum until the page has not been written for a period
of time. This reduces the chances of wasting time checksumming a page that is about
to be written, but it also prevents SoftECC from ever detecting over the entire
inter-write interval.
1.3 Contribution
The main contribution of this thesis is a demonstration of the feasibility of software
based memory integrity checking. More specifically, this thesis contributes a sim-
ple but effective algorithm for verifying memory integrity, significantly reducing the
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chances of receiving undetectable and uncorrectable memory errors. This thesis also
contributes an implementation of memory integrity checking in the JOS kernel and
an experimental evaluation of the performance characteristics of this implementa-
tion. Finally, this thesis contributes suggestions for future work that would allow
100% detection performance and increased error recovery capability.
1.4 Rest of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 3 describes the design of
SoftECC . Section 4 details the implementation of SoftECC as an extension to the
JOS kernel. In section 5 we evaluate the performance characteristics of SoftECC
as it protects several different user-mode access-patterns. Section ?? provides an
argument for the utility of SoftECC on desktop systems and outlines a method for
achieving 100% protection. We conclude in section 6 and provide suggestions for
future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Types of Memory Errors
There are several common causes of memory errors, each with different characteristics.
Hard Errors are caused by physical damage to the underlying DRAM circuitry.
Typically they will affect a particular pattern of memory addresses correspond-
ing to a damaged cell, line, or chip. While many types of errors are easily
reproducible and will be caught by BIOS memory tests, there are more insid-
ious patterns. For example, if the insulation partially breaks down between
several cells, writing to the cells nearby can alter the middle cell's voltage suffi-
ciently to induce a bit flip error. Such errors are pattern dependent and difficult
to find. Compounding this difficulty, such problems may occur only when the
affected memory chip heats up, or may occur only part of the time.
Soft Errors occur when the charge storage representing a bit is sufficiently disturbed
to change that bit's value. As process technology advances, both the capacitance
and voltage used to store information are decreasing, reducing the "critical
charge" necessary to induce a single bit error (9].
Cosmic Radiation is a form of soft error that occurs when random high energy
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particles (mostly neutrons) impact DRAM cells, disrupting their charge storage.
According to Corsair, these single bit errors can happen as often as once a
month [6]. And computers in high altitude cities such as Denver face up to 10x
the risk of computers operating at sea level [8].
Package Radio-isotope Decay can lead to memory errors when trace quantities
of radioactive contaminants present in chip packaging decay, emitting alpha
particles. There was a particularly infamous problem in 1987 when Po21O from a
faulty bottle cleaning machine contaminated an IBM fab producing LSI memory
modules. Affected memory chips suffered over 20 times the soft error rate of
chips produced at other fabs, leading to a large scale hunt for the contaminant
source [7].
Configuration / Protocol Errors on a motherboard can cause problems as well.
In theory, a DRAM module should perform reliably if the motherboard follows
the module's specified timings 1. However, with so many DRAM and moth-
erboard manufacturers in the marketplace, the potential for incompatibility is
great. For example, if the motherboard supplies the DRAM with a lower than
specified voltage, the memory will perform slower than it would with its rated
voltage. Also, each memory module adds parasitic capacitance to the memory
bus. These issues can be a problem for cheap memory modules, which barely
meet their specification.
2.2 ECC memory: the hardware solution
The problem of DRAM cell reliability is not a new one, and for years manufacturers
have been making ECC-DRAM for servers and other machines where reliability is
at a premium. ECC-DRAM effectively and transparently protects against single bit
DRAM errors and provides detection (without correction) for double bit errors.
'For current generation memories, this information is stored on the module's EEPROM Serial
Presence Detect Chip.
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However, ECC-DRAM requires 13% more memory cells per bit (72 cells per 64
bits), and is produced in lower volumes than normal DRAM, both of which increase its
price. Although memory pricing is volatile and inconsistent, it would be reasonable to
estimate a 33% price premium for ECC-DRAM over comparable non-ECC-DRAM.2
Thus, while many "high-end" servers use ECC DRAM, most users are rarely even
aware of the various memory options and almost never choose to pay the price pre-
mium for ECC-DRAM.
No software solution can improve upon the efficacy of hardware ECC at consis-
tency checking DRAM for single bit errors; however with the vast majority of com-
puting devices using non-ECC memory, there is a large space for solutions aiming to
close the reliability gap between normal DRAM and ECC-DRAM.
2.3 Software Solutions
One software memory testing solution is the Memtest86 utility, which runs an ex-
tensive battery of memory test patterns to expose subtle, infrequent, and pattern
dependent memory errors missed by power-on BIOS testing [2]. Memtest86 has its
own kernel and runs in real mode, requiring a reboot. Because Memtest86 tests can
only be performed offline, few users test their memory unless they have reason to
suspect it is failing. Furthermore, because it cannot test memory while it is in use,
Memtest86 provides no protection against soft errors.
In 2000 Rick van Rein noticed that many memory modules that failed a memtest
would fail consistently in the same location [1]. He then wrote a Linux kernel patch
called BadRAM that allocates to itself the regions of physical memory known to have
problems, preventing faulty DRAM cells from being allocated to user tasks. BadRAM
relies on the user to run memtest86 manually to calculate the BadRAM configuration
string (passed as a kernel parameter).
2As of 1/12/05 on Newegg.com: the price range for 1GB of PC3200 DDR DRAM was $155-$275
versus $200-$408 for ECC-DDR. DRAM.
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BadRAM is a good approach for isolating hardware faults from the software level.
In any system with hardware failure, there will be a delay before a sufficiently com-
petent user or administrator can purchase and install new hardware. Software fault
isolation can keep the system up and running while corrective action is taken, allowing
hardware to fail-in-place.
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Chapter 3
Design
SoftECC is a software solution for detecting and correcting soft errors in physical
memory. As a kernel-level extension to the virtual memory system, SoftECC's
operation is transparent to user processes. SoftECC defines three page states based
on their memory access policies and the status of their stored checksum:
Hot: Pages that have been written since the last checksum occurred, and thus do not
have a valid checksum stored. User-mode writes and reads proceed normally. If
all memory pages are left hot, then SoftECC is effectively turned off. Errors
that occur while a page is hot will not be detected.
Trapwrite: Pages that are read-only, and have a valid checksum of their contents
stored so that they can be checked for memory errors. Trapwrite pages might
also have valid redundancy information stored. Writes to trapwrite pages must
be trapped, so that the page can be checked before the write occurs. Reads can
proceed without interruption. In order to minimize the latency of detection,
trapwrite pages should be periodically checked for errors.
Trapall: Pages that allow no access, trapping both reads and writes. Because no
access is possible, trapall pages need not be periodically checksummed.
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The table in figure 3-1 shows an overview of the properties of the three page states,
which are discussed in more detail in the next few sections.
Hot I Trapwrite I Trapall
Valid Checksum no yes yes
Valid Redundancy no maybe yes
Writes poll trap trap
Reads poll poll trap
Vulnerable yes no no
Detection no yes yes
Protection no maybe yes
Figure 3-1: Properties of the three page states
3.1 State Transitions
In order to keep SoftECC's operation transparent to the user program, the transi-
tions from trapall to trapwrite to hot must be triggered automatically whenever
the user program attempts an access operation not allowed by the current state of
the page accessed. In other words, writes to any page force it to transition to the hot
state, and reads to a trapall page force it to transition to trapwrite. There are no
automatic transitions from hot to trapwrite to trapall, and without intervention
from SoftECC, pages would stay hot forever.
The principle of temporal locality says that memory accesses to a particular region
tend to be highly clustered in time. In other words, pages that have been accessed
recently are likely to be accessed soon and pages that have not been accessed recently
are less likely to be accessed soon. Therefor, it makes sense to checksum the hot
pages that have gone the longest since being written, and the trapwrite pages that
have gone the longest since being read.
SoftECC's policy with respect with respect to trapwrite pages is slightly dif-
ferent. In order to minimize the latency of detection, trapwrite pages should be
checked periodically even if they are still being accessed. However, it is not useful to
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continually check pages that are not being accessed. If a trapwrite page becomes
old enough to be checked again and it has not been accessed, then it will be promoted
to trapall, stalling its checksum until just before the next pending access.
3.2 The Trapwrite State
The trapwrite state is for pages that are not expected to be written soon, but might
be read. In order to determine if reads are occurring, SoftECC periodically checks
whether reads have occurred since the last time it checked. If reads don't happen
within a certain period of time, SoftECC will assume that the page has stopped
being read and might not be read for a while. When reads stop occurring on a
trapwrite page, SoftECC promotes it to trapall, checksumming it first if reads
have occurred since the last checksum.
Even if a trapwrite page is still being read and can't be promoted to trapall,
it should still be periodically checksummed. This decision will validate all the reads
that have occurred since the last checksum and prevent any errors that have occurred
from affecting future reads.
If both reads and an error have occurred since the last checksum, the program
state is highly suspect. Even if the page has stored redundancy information allowing
the error to be corrected, the application may have already accessed incorrect data
and propagating the error to another location. For this reason, the application should
be terminated or reset as gracefully as possible. This may require allowing the ap-
plication to run with its questionable state just long enough to save any (hopefully
intact) user data to disk. A more ambitious approach to error recovery is described
in section 6.2.
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3.3 The Trapall State
The trapall state is for pages that are not expected to be read or written soon.
While a page is in the trapall state, any errors that occur are guaranteed to be
detected before they are used. Thus, if these errors are corrected, the user application
can continue running. For this reason, trapall pages store redundancy information.
Redundancy information remains valid until the next write and thus, only needs to
be computed during the first trapall promotion after each write.
The trapall state is also important for performance reasons. On a machine with
1GB of memory, there are a quarter-million physical pages. At any point in time, only
a very small fraction of these pages will be in active use. Many of these pages will be
used to speculatively cache disk blocks that may never be used. If SoftECC had to
divide its page checking efforts between all physical pages, there would not be very
much compute time to spend on any single page and the level of protection offered
would be substantially lower. Instead, the vast majority of pages can be quickly
promoted to trapall status, allowing SoftECC to concentrate its checksumming
efforts on the pages that drift in and out of active use.
3.4 Design Alternatives
3.4.1 The Checksum Queue
Originally, SoftECC had a fourth state called checksum that would check for writes
periodically rather than trapping them. The goal of the checksum state was to avoid
trapping writes to pages that had been checksummed so recently that computing a
second checksum was not worthwhile. After each checksum, a page would spend a
short while in the checksum queue before being promoted to trapwrite (unless a
write was detected).
However, the goal of avoiding not-worthwhile second checksum calculations can
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also be accomplished by the trapwrite state by simply not checking pages that trap
early writes. While this method still requires a trap, on a 2.4Ghz Opteron system,
checksum computations take 1020ns while traps are under 100ns. Thus, the main
cost of trapping a write is the checksum computation, not the actual trap. Because
early writes should be rare, it is not clear that marginal benefit of avoiding a rare
trap even exceeds the marginal overhead of managing a third page queue.
3.4.2 Linux: Swapfile of a modified ramfs partition
One possibility under consideration for achieving memory integrity checking on Linux
was to design a modified version of the ramfs filesystem with integrity checking. Ramfs
is a simpler version of tmpfs, a special combination block-device/filesystem that stores
its contents to virtual memory rather than to a block device. Ramfs is designed to
utilize only physical memory and does not support swapping to disk.
The idea was to use a ramfs partition to store a swapfile. The benefit of this
approach is that Linux's own memory management system would swap out the least
active pages to the modified ramfs disk where they would be checked for integrity.
This approach would not test the design of SoftECC in full detail, but would be
a means to enable memory protection on a Linux system without having to modify
the kernel's memory management system.
Unfortunately, this solution was simply impossible. Linux refuses to use a swapfile
stored on either a ramfs or tmpfs partition. This limitation is most likely due to an
internal conflict arising from the tight integration of ramfs with the virtual memory
system.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
The JOS kernel was developed to be used as a teaching aid for MIT's Operating
Systems class, 6.828. It was designed with simplicity and extensibility in mind, and
after being used in the classroom for several years, it is now mature and thoroughly
tested. In short it is a ready made platform for testing new operating systems ideas
without having to deal with the complexity of a kernel intended for widespread use.
The rest of this chapter describes the modifications SoftECC makes to the JOS
kernel.
4.1 Implementing Page State Transitions
SoftECC maintains a queue of pages that are waiting to have a periodic action
performed. At each timer interrupt (in JOS, this happens 100 times per second),
SoftECC runs for a while, processing the page queue and checksumming pages. The
length of time that SoftECC consumes is carefully chosen in order to keep CPU-
usage at its target value (see listing 4.1). Each time a page makes its way to the head
of the queue, SoftECC considers the page (see listing 4.2), taking any necessary
actions, and inserting the page back into the tail of the queue.
When a hot page reaches the head of the queue, SoftECC uses the DIRTY bits
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to check whether the page has been written since the last time it was inserted into the
queue (see section 4.2.2). If the page hasn't been written to, then SoftECC assumes
that the user process has stopped writing to the page and promotes it to trapwrite.
Otherwise, the page is shuffled to the back of the queue to be checked again later.
When a trapwrite page reaches the head of the queue, SoftECC checks whether
the page has been read since the last queue insertion. If it hasn't been read since it
was inserted into the queue, SoftECC assumes that the user program has stopped
reading the page and promotes it to trapall. Otherwise, SoftECC shuffles the page
to the back of the queue, checking whether the page if its checksum age exceeds the
threshold.
Listing 4.1: The Periodic Function
int softecc-cpu-load ; // target %CPU load
int32-t softecc-time-left ; // unused CPU time belonging to SoftECC
uint32-t softecc.-time-last ; /7 the last time SoftECC was run
void on -periodic (void)
{
uint32_t time-start = gettime (;
uint32_t time-elapsed = (time-start - softecc-time-last );
softecc-time-left += time-elapsed * softecc-cpu-percent / 10);
uint32_t time-done = time-start + softecc-time-left;
while( get _time () < time-done) {
consider-queue-head (; // do some work
}
softecc-time-left -= get-time() - time-start /7 may be negative
softecc-time-last = time-start ; 7/ record this start time fo- next run
}
void on.idle (void)
{
consider-queue-head (); // do some work
sys-yield (;
}
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Listing 4.2: The Consider Function
PageQueue page-queue;
void consider(struct Page* pp)
{
struct Page *pp = remove-head(page..queue);
switch (pp->state) {
case HOT:
if(check-dirty(pp)) {
// Move to the back of the line
page-queue. insert-tail (pp);
} else {
// Promote to Trapwrite status
set-checksum (pp);
pp->state = TRAPWRITE;
page-queue. insert-tail(pp);
}
break;
case TRAPWRITE:
if(check-access(pp)) {
/// Do I renew the checksum to minimize checksum-age?
if ( checksum-age (pp) > param-max-checksum-age) {
check.page(pp);
}
// Move to the back of the line
page-queue. insert-tail (pp);
} else {
// Promote to TrapAll status
if(pp->flags & ACCESS) {
check-page(pp);
I
pp->state = TRAPALL;
}
break;
case TIRAPALL:
shrink-redundancy-information (pp);
page-queue. insert-tail (pp);
break;
}
4.1.1 Read and Write Trap Handlers
If SoftECC traps a write to either a trapwrite or trapall page (see section 4.2.1),
that page must transition to the hot state before the write can occur (see listing 4.3).
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As discussed in section 1.2, it is not always worthwhile to compute a second checksum.
However, as long as the page's checksum-age and thus, the size of the potential
inter-checksum interval exceeds the threshold, SoftECC will check the page. Next,
SoftECC inserts the page back into the queue so that it will be periodically checked
to determine when the user-mode program is done writing to it. Finally, the time
used to perform these steps must be counted against SoftECC's CPU usage for the
purposes of load throttling (see section 4.1).
Likewise, if SoftECC traps a read to a trapall page, that page must transition to
the trapwrite state before the write can occur. As with writes, the second checksum
is only performed if the value of the potential protection interval exceeds a threshold.
Note that, if the user-mode application issues a write just after the read (which is
common), then the page will fail the threshold test and transition directly to the hot
state for only the cost of the trap.
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Listing 4.3: Read and write trap handlers
void trap -write(struct Page* pp)
{
time-t time-start = get.time ();
if(checksum-age (pp) >= param.min-detect _threshold () {
check-page (pp);
}
pp->st ate = HOT;
page-queue. insert-tail(pp);
softecc-time-left -= (get-time () - time-start );
}
void trap-read (struct Page* pp)
{
timet timestart = get-time ();
if(checksum-age (pp) >= param _min _protect _threshold) {
check-page (pp);
}
pp->st ate = TRAPWRITE;
page-queue. inserttail (pp);
softecc-time.left -= (get-time () - time-start )
}
4.2 The JOSkern VMM extensions
The JOS kernel VMM is fairly simple, relying primarily on the Pagestructure to
represent physical pages (see listing 4.4). The original Page structure is fairly spartan,
containing only a reference count, and a free list pointer.
SoftECC extends the Pagestructure with five items. Each page needs to store its
current state number and most recent checksum for consistency checking. In order
to implement the page queue (see section 4.1), another link was required as well a
variable to store the time when the page was inserted into the queue (to determine
queue age; see section 4.1). Because trapping accesses to a physical pages requires
modifying all the virtual mappings that point to it, each page has a pointer to a list
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of virtual mappings (see section 4.2.1). Lastly, SoftECC adds eight bits worth of
flags to the Pagestructure. Two of these will be needed for the special access and
dirty bits (see section 4.2.2).
Listing 4.4: The Page Structure
struct Page {
Page *
uint16-t
uint8-t
checksumt
Page *
uint32-t
Mapping *
uint8-t
struct Mapping
Mapping *
pte-t *
pp-link;
pp-ref ;
/
//
//7
/
//
/
//
//7
state ;
checksum;
queue-link;
queue-time ;
va-map-list
flags ;
free list link
reference count
new:
new:
new:
new:
new:
new:
current page state
stored checksum value
page queue link
time of last queue inse
list of mapped va entri
flags , esp accessed and
{
next _link;
pte ;
//7
//7
linked-list pointer
address of PTE that maps to
4.2.1 Trapping Memory Access on x86
Removing the write (PTEW) and user (PTEU) permission bits from a PTE causes
subsequent user-mode writes and reads to the corresponding virtual page to throw
a page fault which SoftECC can intercept. In order to trap accesses to a physical
page, SoftECC needs to modify all PTE's that map to that page.
Because SoftECC removes the PTEW bit to enable write trapping, it needs to
know the original state of that bit in order to restore the bit during trapped write. In
other words, SoftECC needs a way to distinguish between read-only virtual mappings
to trapwrite (and trapall) physical pages and originally writable virtual mappings
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to trapwrite pages. Because a physical page can have multiple virtual mappings
with differing permissions, this information must be for each virtual mapping. Be-
cause user-mode pages in JOS always have the PTEU bit set, its original status is
unambiguous.
Intel's x86 architecture defines three PTE bits to be available for operating system
use. Of these, JOS kernel utilizes two, referred to as PTECOW (Copy On Write)
and PTESHARE, and are both used primarily in the implementation of fork. When
a process forks, JOS marks all writable pages as copy on write and clears the PTE-W
bit. When the next user-mode write is trapped, the page is remapped to a copy of the
original, preventing writes from one process becoming visible in the other. However,
pages with the PTESHARE bit enabled are mapped directly by fork so that writes
will be visible to both processes, allowing inter-process communication. This leaves
only one available PTE bit remaining.
SoftECC defines the last remaining PTE bit to be PTEHOW (Heat On Write).
When SoftECC clears the PTEW bit, it stores the original state of that bit to
PTE-HOW, and when trapping a write restores PTEW only if PTEHOW is set.
When a page is trapping writes (the page state is either trapwrite or trapall),
PTE-HOW is a proxy to the "real" value of PTE-W as concerns the rest of the kernel.
Thus, any statement that wants to read PTE-W should instead read the logical "or"
of both PTEW and PTEHOW. Any statement that would have written PTEW
should now write PTEHOW if the underlying page is trapping writes and PTE-W if
not. These changes can also be abstracted by using the accessor methods defined in
listing 4.5. For example, when the original version of fork sets PTE-COW, it clears
PTE-W. Thus fork now clears both PTEW and PTEHOW.
Because JOS is an exokernel design [11], many of the more complicated operating
system features are implemented in user-space and call into sys-page-map to change
permission bits. Thanks to the flexibility of the exokernel design, updating this system
call was sufficient to ensure correctness for the majority of JOS kernel's feature set.
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Listing 4.5: PTE-HOW Compatible Accessor Methods
bool getPTE.W (pte-t pte)
{
return (pte & PTE.W) | (pte & PTE.HOW)
}
void setPTEW (ptet * pte)
{
struct Page* pp = pte2page (pte);
i f (pp->s t at e == TRAPWRTE
pp->s t a t e == TRAPALL)
*pte PThHOW; // set PTEIHOW
else
* pte PTEW; / set PTE-W
}
void clearPTEW (pte t* pte)
*pte &= PTEW // clear PTKW
*pte &= ~PTEROW; /7 clear PTEIHOW
4.2.2 Checking for Prior Memory Access on x86
To check for prior memory accesses to a page, SoftECC can inspect the accessed
(PTE-A) and dirty (PTED) PTE bits. These bits are set automatically by the CPU
whenever the corresponding virtual page is read from or written to. A physical page
should be considered accessed or dirty if any of the PTE's where it is mapped are
marked accessed or dirty. Periodically polling the accessed and dirty bits does not
allow SoftECC to intercept page access events before they occur; however, polling
avoids the overhead of trapping into kernel space.
There is one additional complication to consider when polling. If one of a page's
virtual mappings is accessed and then unmapped, the corresponding PTE will no
longer be associated with the physical page and thus the accessed and dirty bits will
be lost. This could result in a dirty physical page appearing to be not dirty. For
this reason, whenever a PTE is about to be overwritten, the status of its accessed
and dirty bits needs to be retained. This is accomplished by "or"ing these bits with
special per physical page ACCESS and DIRTY bits (stored in the Page structure; see
listing 4.4).
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Listing 4.6: Checksum accessor methods
void check -page (struct Page* pp)
{
if(calculate-checksum(pp) != pp->checksum) {
h andle-memory -error (pp);
}
clear-access(pp);
clear-dirty (pp);
7/ Reset ACCESS bits
/7 Reset DIRTY bits
void set-checksum(struct Page* pp)
{
pp->checksum = calculate.checksum(pp);
clear -access (pp); // Reset ACCESS bits
clear-dirty (pp); // Reset DIRTY bits
}
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}
4.3 Checksums
The simplest and quickest x86 checksum computation is a dword length (32 bit) xor
operation performed over the entire 4k page (see listing 4.7). Effectively, this produces
32 individual parity bits, each one covering a stripe of 1024 bits.
Since each stripe only has single bit parity, some double-bit errors are not de-
tectable; however, this limitation is not a problem. The probability of receiving a
true, instantaneous double bit error'is exceptionally low [7]. And the probability of
receiving two single-bit errors within the same 1024 bit stripe within the same inter-
checksum interval is very low as well. The probability of a double-bit error within a
single stripe during an period of time is the square of the probability of a single-bit
error during the same period of time. Unless the inter-checksum interval extends so
long (multiple years) that the probability of a single-bit error (within a single 1024
bit stripe) rises significantly, double-bit errors will be exceedingly rare, and detection
performance will be well defined by the vulnerability metric (see section 1.2).
Listing 4.7: The Checksum Computation
checksunt calculate-checksum-c (struct Page* pp){ // get a pointer to page contents
checksum-t* p = (checksumAt*)page2kva(pp);
checksum-t ret = 0;
int i;
for ( i =0; i <1024; i++) {
ret = p[i; / Xor}
return ret
}
Unfortunately, the default assembly code for checksum calculation generated by
gcc (see listing 4.8) is less than optimal, requiring almost 3000 ns to execute on a
'Actually, double-bit errors in DRAM need not be cause by the exact same event (eg high energy
cosmic neutron). Two single-bit errors within the same refresh cycle (approx 4-64ms, barring earlier
programmatic access) is sufficient.
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2.4Ghz AMD Opteron 150 system with 1GB of DDR400 memory (see the table in
figure 4-1). The core loop is a single implicit memory load and a trivial xor instruction;
however, each loop iteration executes three instructions for loop control.
Far less obvious, there is a subtle alignment problem with the compiler generated
code (see listing 4.9). The core loop crosses a 16 byte boundary, putting it in a
different two different cache lines. The loader aligns the start of the function to a 16
byte boundary, but the compiler is not smart enough to realize just how important
the alignment of the core loop is. Simply inserting a few nop's before the core loop
improves performance to 2000 ns.
Forcing the compiler to unroll the loop provides considerable benefit (see list-
ing 4.10). The core loop is now 16 instructions, effectively amortizing the overhead
of the loop control instructions. Checksum now runs in 1489 ns.
Utilizing the 128bit packed xor from Intel's MMX intstruction set allows for even
more improvement, bringing execution time to 1058 ns (see listing 4.11). The core
loop is now a scant 8 pxor instructions that do the work of 32 regular xors. With only
8 instructions consuming 128 bytes of data, the calculation is now heavily bound by
memory bandwidth.
Finally, it is possible to optimize the memory access just slightly by interleaving
the instructions to exercise multiple cache lines at once, checksumming an entire page
in just 1024 ns (see listing 4.12).
Listing 4.8: Compiler-generated (gcc -03) assembly code for calculate-checksum
calculate.chccksum:
{...} ; set cdx = p (start of page)
xor %cax, %cax set cax = 0
xor %ccx, %ccx set ccx = 0
loop :
xor (%cdx. % ccx, 4) % cax cax = cax xor32 M.-EDY[cdx + 4*ccx}
inc %ccx increment index
cmnp $1024 , %ccx compare
ji loop loop if ccx < 1024
return eax
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Listing 4.9: Annotated objdump output for compiler-generated code
080485d0 <calculate-checksum-c >:
----------- 16-BYTE-BOUNDARY 
-
80485d0: 55 push %ebp
80485d1: 89 e5 mov %csp.%cbp
80485d3: 8b 4d 08 mov 0x8(%ebp),%ecx
80485d6: 31 cO xor %eax,%cax
80485d8: 31 d2 xor %edx,%cdx
80485da: 89 f6 mov %esi.%csi
core-loop-start :
80485dc: 33 04 91 xor (%ccx.%edx ,4) ,%cax
80485df: 42 inc %edx
-------- 
--------- 16-BYTE-BOUNDARY- 
- --
80485c0: 81 fa ff 03 00 00 cmp $Ox3ff,%edx
80485e6: 7c f4 jIe 80485dc <core-loop-start>
80485c8: c9 leave
80485c9: c3 ret
Listing 4.10: Loop-unrolled (gcc -03 -funroll-loops) assembly code for calcu-
late-checksum
calculate- checksum
{ ... }I ; set edx = p (start of page)
xor %cax, %cax set cax = 0
xor %ccx, %ccx set ccx = 0
loop:
xor OxOO(%edx, %ecx, 4), %eax cax = cax xor32 MEM[edx + 4*ccx + 0]
xor 0x04(%edx, %ecx, 4), %eax cax = cax xor32 MEM[edx + 4*ccx + 41
xor Ox3c(%edx, %ccx, 4), %eax cax = cax xor32 IVIEMI[edx + 4*ecx + 60]
addl $Ox10, %ccx increment index
cmp $1024 . %ccx compare
j] loop loop if ccx < 1024
{ ... ; return eax
Listing 4.11: MMX Loop-unrolled assembly code for calculate-checksum
calculate-checksum
{...}I ; set cdx = p (start of page)
pxor %xrml. %xmm; set xmml = 0
xor %ccx %ccx set ccx = 0
loop:
pxor OxOO(%cdx, %ecx), %xmm1 xmml = xmml xor128 NMMI~edx + ccx + 0]
pxor OxiO(%edx, %ccx), %xmm ; xmml = xmml xor128 MEvIMedx + ccx + 16]
pxor 0x70(%cdx, %ccx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 MvEMvI[edx + ccx + 112]
addl $0x80 %ecx increment index
cmp $4096 %.ccx compare
jIe loop loop if ccx < 4096
subl $OxO.%csp allocate 128bits of stack space
movdqu %xmml,(%csp ) and store xmml
xor %cax,%eax cax = 0
xor 0x00(%csp),%cax eax = cax xor xmml[0:31]
xor 0x04(%csp).%cax cax = eax xor xmml[32:63]
xor 0x08(%csp),%cax cax = eax xor xmml[64:95]
xor OxOc(%esp),%cax cax = eax xor xmml[96:127]
addl $OxlO.%csp : release stack space
... } return cax
4.4 Redundancy for Error Correction
To enable error correction, enough redundant information must be stored about the
contents of a page that the location of a single-bit error is determinable. There are
at least three options, each with various advantages:
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Listing 4.12: Interleaved MMX Loop-unrolled assembly code for calculate-checksum
calculate-checksum:
{...} II ; set edx p (start of page)
pxor %xmml, %xmm; set xmml = 0
xor %ecx, %ccx set ccx = 0
loop:
pxor 0x00(%cdx, %ecx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 MEMIedx + ecx + 0]
pxor 0x40(%edx. %ecx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 MEM edx + ecx + 64]
pxor 0x10(%edx, %ecx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 ME[ edx + ecx + 16]
pxor 0x50(%edx, %ecx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 MEMI[ cdx + ccx + 80]
pxor 0x20(%cdx, %ecx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 MEWIe edx + ecx + 32]
pxor 0x60(%edx, %ecx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 VEMI edx + ecx + 96]
pxor 0x30(%edx, %ecx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 MEM[edx + ccx + 48]
pxor 0x70(%cdx, %ecx), %xmml xmml = xmml xor128 MEM[edx + ecx + 112]
addl $0x80, %ccx increment index
cmp $4096. %ccx compare
jIc loop loop if ccx < 4096
cax = xor(xmml[0:311, xmml[32:63], xmml[64:95] xmml[96: 27]
return cax
Figure 4-1: Computational cost of various checksum implementations (2.4Ghz AMD
Opteron 150)
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Checksum Cost
Plain C 2932 ns
Aligned C 2000 ns
Loop-unrolled 32-bit 1489 ns
Loop-unrolled MMX 1058 ns
Interleaved-unrolled MMX 1024 ns
4.4.1 Full Memory Copy
The simplest redundancy scheme is to allocate a second page, and make a full dupli-
cate copy of the original. The drawback to this approach is poor storage efficiency,
requiring double the physical DRAM. However, this method has a compelling advan-
tage: it is very fast (1694 ns).
Like the normal checksum operation, a memory copy is bounded by the DRAM
bandwidth, except that whereas a checksum condenses the incoming data to a single
dword, a memory copy writes a full page back to DRAM. Because both the checksum
and memcpy operations require reading the same data from memory, calculating
a checksum while performing a memcpy takes no more time than performing the
memcpy alone.
4.4.2 Striped Hamming Code
A hamming code[12] is perhaps the most compelling of the traditional error correcting
coding schemes. Most importantly, it does not require mangling the original data bits.
Also, it is reasonably compact and only moderately computationally expensive.
Hamming coding works by setting the value of every bit occupying a power of two
address in the signal (eg, the 1st bit, 2nd bit, 4th bit, 8th bit... 2 N bit) to be the
xor of all bits whose addresses' binary representations have the Nth bit set. These
bits are the parity bits. The bits not located at power of two addresses are data bits.
Naturally, in the actual implementation, the logical Hamming code signal addresses
will not match the actual addresses of the bits. The data bits will remain in place,
while the parity bits will be stored in an array of redundancy data.
To correct a single-bit error, simply flip the bit at the address that is the sum of
the addresses of all the parity bits that are incorrect. If only one parity bit is incorrect,
the error is that parity bit. In order that errors to the parity bits be detected, the
pages containing parity bits are checksummed by SoftECC in the same manner as
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normal pages, except that because only SoftECC accesses these pages, they need
not be trapped or polled like normal pages.
4.4.3 Hard Disk Storage
The third redundancy level is to store a duplicate of the page's contents to disk.
This has the advantage of requiring no extra memory storage; however, disk access is
quite slow. Even the fastest hard disks still have access times of several milliseconds,
thousands of times longer than tchk . Not all of this time requires CPU attention, but
the CPU-overhead of disk management will still be greater than for the other two
schemes.
In some cases, hard disk redundancy already exists. The executable images and
the file cache originated from copies on disk. Also, the virtual memory system on
commercial operating systems periodically copies dirty pages to a swapfile in case
they need to be swapped out to make room for other memory uses.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
5.1 Testing Methodology
In order to analyze the performance of SoftECC on various workloads, a test harness
was created. SoftECC 's checking was disabled for the test harness, and only the
memory pages for the benchmark applications were included in the results.
The first plan for testing was to introduce errors at random memory locations at
randomized randomized time intervals and count how many were detected. Because
of the cyclical nature of the benchmarks, each page is guaranteed to be accessed at
least once per iteration, so any errors not detected after a complete iteration were
assumed to be missed. Because the results of the user-mode benchmarks are not
of interest, errors need not be corrected as they will not affect the program flow.
Unfortunately this conservative benchmarking strategy was extremely slow, taking
hours to produce a single data point.
An important properties of soft errors are that they are randomly distributed in
both space and time. Put another way, the probability or density of soft errors is
evenly distributed in space and time. Rather than introduce errors one at a time
randomly distributed between the various pages and averaging the results to achieve
a probability, introducing one error in each page would directly measure the instan-
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taneous probability of detecting a randomly placed error.
Furthermore, the instantaneous probability of error detection or correction can
be measured without actually introducing errors and waiting. Errors that occur on
a page during a vulnerable interval will never be detected. Errors during either
detection or protection intervals will always be detected. Thus the instantaneous
probability of detection is simply the fraction of pages that are currently in a detection
or protection intervals.
Because all hot pages have been written at least once and do not have valid
checksums, hot pages are always in vulnerable intervals. Because they trap reads
and are guaranteed to have been checksummed since the last access, trapall pages
are always in protection intervals. Because they do not trap reads, the correct interval
type of a trapwrite is not known until it is next checksummed. If a trapwrite page
is checksummed without being accessed since its last checksum, then it just completed
a protection interval. Otherwise, it was a detection interval.1
Because pages only change inter-checksum interval status when they are check-
summed, it is possible to do better than randomly sampling the instantaneous prob-
ability of detection. By using the vulnerability metric, the overall probability of
detection for an interval of time can be calculated by monitoring for page checksum
events (see listing 5.1).
While this improved methodology does not provide the same tangibility as intro-
ducing and detecting actual errors, it is not only much much faster; it is also more
accurate, directly measuring the quantities of interest rather than approximating
them through statistical methods.
'If trapwrite pages are accessed while their checksum is still young, then they will transition
to hot without checksumming first, rendering the entire interval vulnerable. This design is fine,
however, because the next checksum will occur when the page is hot, correctly counting the time
the page spent in the trapwrite state as being vulnerable to silent errors.
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Listing 5.1: Statistics gathering for inter-checksum intervals (at checksum events)
void stats-on-checksum(struct Page* pp){
pause-time (;
// Calculate the length of the Inter-Checksum Interval
time-t ICI-duration = get-time() - pp->checksum time;
pp->checksum-time = get-time (;
switch(pp->status) {
case HOT:
// By design hot pages have been written at least once
7/ Thus, this was a vulnerable interval
stats . vuln += ICI-duration;
break;
case TRAPWRITE:
7/ This is the complex one ...
// By design there were no writes , but maybe reads , so
// Check the ACCESS bit (s)
check-access (pp);
if (pp->flags & ACCESS)
stats . detect += ICI-duration;
else
stats . protect += ICI.duration
break;
case TRAPALL:
// By design , there were no reads , no writes:
// Thus, this was a protection interval
stats . protect += ICI-duration;
break;
unpause-time (;
}
5.2 Benchmarks
Perhaps the most important consideration when benchmarking SoftECC is to decide
what user program to execute. The memory access patterns of the user program will
have a far greater impact upon the performance of SoftECC than any other single
factor. Unfortunately, many traditional benchmarks end up as pathological best or
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worst cases.
For example, many CPU intensive benchmarks have a very small memory footprint
and operate primarily on a single page of stack memory. For a program with such a
small memory footprint, SoftECC would be unable to significantly impact reliability.
At any point in time the program's error exposure will already be limited to its single
page of memory. And if SoftECC were to checksum this memory page, it would
almost immediately be written to.
What follows are preliminary benchmarks that outline some of the factors affecting
SoftECC's performance.
5.2.1 Sequential Writes
Consider a benchmark that repeatedly performs sequential writes to memory (see
listing 5.2). Such a memory access pattern has bad temporal locality because the
pages most recently accessed have the least chance of being accessed, while the oldest
pages are most likely to be accessed next. Because SoftECC uses a LRU-like scheme,
it will tend to checksum the oldest pages first, just as they are about to be written
to again.
Listing 5.2: Sequential Write Benchmark
int array-size = 1000 * (PGSIZE/4);
uint32_t array [array-size];
void bench-seq-write() {
while(1) {
for(int i=0; j<arraysize ; j++) {
array[i] = i;
}}}
Unless SoftECC can checksum pages faster than they are written, it will spend
all of its time working on checksumming pages that will soon be overwritten. This is
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demonstrated in figure 5-1, which shows SoftECC's detection rate hovering near zero
until the checksumming exceeds the rate of writing around 25% CPU-load. After this
point, SoftECC is able to checksum pages immediately after the user application
finishes writing to them and detection performance rises to nearly 100%.
At 25% CPU-load (33% CPU-overhead), SoftECC has a 0.33:1 CPU usage ratio
with the user application. This indicates that the user application takes 3 times
as long to write a page as SoftECC takes to checksum a page. Herein lies the
significance of optimizing SoftECC 's checksum algorithm (see section 4.3). Using
the unoptimized checksum algorithm, SoftECC the rise in detection doesn't occur
until 45% CPU-load (81% CPU-overhead) (see figure 5-2).
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Figure 5-1: Checking performance for sequential writes
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Figure 5-2: Checking performance for sequential writes using
sum computation
the unoptimized check-
5.2.2 Random Word Writes
Consider a benchmark that allocated all available memory to
written with random accesses (see listing 5.3). Because this
temporal locality, we expect SoftECC to perform poorly.
a single array that was
benchmark exhibits no
As can be seen in the left graph of figure 5-3, SoftECC doesn't manage to protect
a significant fraction of the data pages until its checksumming keeps up with the rate
of page turnover, allowing it to compute a checksum after each memory write. For
random word writes, this implies that SoftECC will need an order of magnitude
more compute time than the user-mode code 2. Because of this, SoftECC's failed
2It takes 1024 dword reads to checksum a page, versus 1 dword write to invalidate that checksum.
43
I
I
I
I
I
0 .
0 --
0 --
50--
0 10 20 310 40 CIO6 70 .0 90 10
0 10 20 3 0 5 0 9
.. CPU4.-
7
1
'. CPU-imd
0
100
90
g0
40
30
20
10
a 70 so 90 1000 10 20 30 40 50 so
. CPU-k-c
Listing 5.3: Random Word Write Benchmark
int array-size = 1000 * (PGSIZE/4);
uint32_t array [ array-size ];
void bench-rand-word-write() {
while(1) {
uint32_t r = sys-genrand();
int i = r \% array-size;
array [p] = r
}
}
efforts increase the exposure time without decreasing the exposure size, yielding
a net increase in the vulnerability metrics that only gets worse with increasing CPU
use (see the right graph in figure 5-3).
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Figure 5-3: Checking performance for random word writes
5.2.3 Random Page Writes
While protecting fine-grained random word writes is costly, the situation is quite
different for coarse grained random writes. Consider a benchmark that simulates the
activity of a block cache for a filesytem by picking a random page and writing to it
(see listing 5.4).
The only thing that prevents the rise in this graph from occurring at 99.9% CPU-load is that random
number calculations are expensive, dominating the runtime of the user-code.
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Listing 5.4: Random Page Write Benchmark
int array-size = 1000 * (PGSIZE/4);
uint32-t array [ array-size I;
void bench-rand-page() {
while (1) {
uint32_t r = sys.genrand(;
int i = r % 1000;
for ( int j =0; j <1024; j++) {
array[i*PGSIZE+j] =r;
}
}
}
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Figure 5-4: Checking performance for random page writes
5.2.4 Memory Traces
While artificial benchmarks can provide many insights as to the factors affecting Soft-
ECC 's performance, ultimately, it is SoftECC 's integrity checking performance on
real-world applications that is of greatest interest. Real-world applications have far
more complexity than can be captured by an artificial benchmark. Unfortunately, it
is not feasible to port a large application such as gcc to JOS kernel, as this would
require emulating a significant fraction of the standard POSIX kernel API calls. For
this reason, we acquired 1 million entry memory access traces from four applications:
bzip, gcc. and swim. These traces were published as a part of the course materials
for Notre Dame's Operating Systems Principles class, CSE 341 [10], and were derived
from four SPEC CPU2000 benchmarks of the same names (see table 5-5) [13].
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Benchmark Category Suite
176.gcc C Programming Language Compiler CINT2000
256.bzip2 Compression CINT2000
171.swim Shallow Water Modeling CFP2000
200.sixtrack High Energy Nuclear Physics Accelerator Design CFP2000
Figure 5-5: SPEC CPU2000 Benchmarks Represented In Memory Traces
Figures 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, and 5-10 reflect the performance of SoftECC while replaying
1 million entry traces of bzip, gcc, swim, and sixpack. One striking feature of these
graphs is that on all four benchmarks, SoftECC is able to achieve approximately a
50% error detection rate with less than 1% CPU-load, which implies that about half
of the pages utilized by these applications are being accessed in a read-only manner.
This observation is confirmed by the statistics in table 5-6.
There is no similar effect for the correction rate, implying that every page is
being accessed repeatedly. Unfortunately, the source of these repeated accesses is the
looping of the memory trace.
As demonstrated in table 5-6, for gcc, swim, and sixpack, there are a significant
number of pages that are only accessed once during the trace. However, these ac-
cesses occur each time the memory trace loops. Because the memory traces are so
short, these accesses appear periodic to SoftECC , much like the access patterns in
the sequential write benchmark. Consequently, the number of single access pages is
roughly proportional to the overhead threshold where protection performance begins
to rise. Similarly, the number of single write pages is roughly proportional to the
overhead threshold where detection performance begins to rise. This suggests that
these memory traces are insufficiently short to demonstrate SoftECC's performance,
and better benchmarks are needed.
46
Figure 5-6: Memory Trace Statistics
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Figure 5-8: Checking performance while replaying a 1M entry trace of gcc
47
Trace bzip gcc swim [sixpack
Writes 122419 107184 67170 160983
Reads 877581 892816 932830 839017
Unique Addresses 11113 37697 93694 84920
Unique Pages 317 2852 2543 3890
Read-only Pages 167 1707 1374 1825
Pages Written 1 time 26 471 397 827
Pages Written 2 times 10 148 124 271
Pages Accessed 1 time 16 886 690 1399
Pages Accessed 2 times 19 293 292 500
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Figure 5-9: Checking performance while replaying a 1M entry trace of swim
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Figure 5-10: Checking performance while replaying a IM entry trace of sixpack
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Chapter 6
Summary
6.1 Conclusions
The preliminary benchmarks indicate that SoftECC can halve the number of unde-
tected soft error using only minimal compute time. Most multi-user, multi-process
operating systems in use today exibit significant spacial and temporal locality of data
access and stand to benefit greatly from the added reliability SoftECC can provide.
Because it is implemented at the kernel-level, SoftECC's operation is transparent to
user-mode applications. This indicates that for a minimal overhead cost, SoftECC
can provide added protection against soft errors to existing systems. Furthermore,
SoftECC is capable of exploiting idle CPU-time to perform its checks.
6.2 Future Work
Linux Implementation
Ideally, SoftECC would have been implemented as a patch to the Linux kernel.
However, there are significant implementation issues to overcome before SoftECC
on Linux can become a reality. Perhaps the greatest challenge is to find ways to
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minimize SoftECC 's impact on other virtual memory features. For x86 systems,
the only practical way to trap user mode memory accesses is to modify the virtual page
table entries by removing the Write, Present, or User permission bits. Overloading
the functionality of the page table permission bits requires checking every statement
within the 'kernel that references these bits in order to verify that existing kernel
functionality has not been compromised.
While the size and complexity of the Linux kernel prevented a Linux implemen-
tation during this iteration of the project, an implementation on a full-featured OS
will be necessary before SoftECC can have any broad applicability.
Enhanced Error Recovery
The recovery scenario to a correctable but not protected (detected before potential
use) error would be much better if it were possible to emulate the backward execution
of the application code. In some (but clearly not all) cases, this can be done even on
x86. In the best case, an error could be demonstrably unused, and the application
could continue running. In other cases, it is possible to prove that the error propagated
to certain other memory locations, which could also be corrected by emulating the
reexecution of the instructions that used tainted data. Even if it is not possible to
prove that all tainted memory locations had been fixed, the application level recovery
scheme (graceful termination) would have a better chance of success.
Improved Benchmark Results
Unfortunately, due to constraints on what user-mode benchmarks could be ported
to the JOS kernel, the benchmarking results are incomplete. Future work entails
aquiring or recording more extensive memory access traces, including access timing
information. These would be used to give a much clearer picture of SoftECC's
performance in real-world scenarios. Alternatively, real-world applications could be
ported to run on top of the JOS kernel.
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